Wild Diana monkeys, Cercopithecus diana, of Taï forest, Ivory Coast, are preyed upon by leopards, Panthera pardus, and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. These two predators differ in their main hunting tactic and Diana monkeys attempt to avoid predation with two distinct antipredator strategies: conspicuous alarm-calling behaviour to leopards and silent, cryptic behaviour to chimpanzees. However, the Diana monkeys' choice of the appropriate antipredator strategy is complicated by the fact that chimpanzees themselves also fall prey to leopards. Chimpanzees give loud and conspicuous alarm screams when they detect a leopard. When these chimpanzees' leopard alarm calls were played back to different groups of Diana monkeys, in about half of the cases recipients switched from a chimp-specific cryptic response to a leopard-specific conspicuous response, suggesting that some individuals assumed the presence of a leopard. Groups whose home range was in the core area of the resident chimpanzee community were more likely to respond this way than more peripheral groups, indicating between-group differences in semantic knowledge. In a follow-up experiment, the monkeys' understanding of the chimpanzee alarm calls was further assessed with a prime-probe technique. Monkeys were primed with chimpanzee alarm calls and then, 5 min later, tested with leopard growls to see whether they were able to anticipate the presence of a leopard. Results were consistent with the hypothesis that monkeys responding cryptically to chimpanzee alarm calls did so because they were not able to understand the calls' meaning. Data are discussed with respect to three possible cognitive mechanisms, associative learning, specialized learning programmes, and causal reasoning, that could have led to causal knowledge in some individuals but not others.
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In several studies, nonhuman primates have shown a surprising inability to understand even basic causal problems of impulse mechanics (Visalberghi & Tomasello 1998) . In a colony of captive longtailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis, for example, individuals failed to develop a very simple tool use technique invented by one colony member, raking in a fruit from outside the enclosure with a stick, even though subjects were highly motivated, had ample exposure to the problem, and were given plenty of opportunities to practise the technique themselves (Kummer 1995; Zuberbühler et al. 1996) . Because most nonhuman primates do not normally use tools in the wild, one hypothesis is that the neural resources necessary for an understanding of causality in the physical domain are simply not present (but see Hauser et al. 1999) .
However, causal understanding might be advanced in contexts involving social interactions, such that monkeys perform better when problems involve animate beings rather than inanimate objects (Humphrey 1976). Cheney et al. (1995) , for example, have shown that free-ranging chacma baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, may perceive or even recognize cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions. In this species, dominance relationships are partially mediated by two kinds of vocalizations: the 'grunts' given by a female to lower-ranking group members and the 'fear barks' given to higher-ranking ones. Through the use of a playback experiment, it was possible to show that causally inconsistent call sequences, a higher-ranking animal responding with fear barks to a lower-ranking animal's grunts, elicited stronger responses in recipients than control sequences that were made causally consistent.
In the wild, there is selective pressure for monkeys to predict not only the behaviour of other group members but also that of neighbouring groups, heterospecific competitors and predators. Here I describe experiments designed to investigate monkeys' understanding of cause-effect relations involving predators. The
